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Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging Discourse within International 
Climate Change Governance? 
Over  the  past  five  years  there  have  been  a  series  of  significant  international  climate 
change  agreements  involving  elite  state  actors  only.  The  Asia-Pacific  Partnership  on 
Clean Development and Climate (APP), APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration of 2007 and 
US Major Economies Meetings (MEM) of 2007-08 all display a shift towards a model of 
international climate change governance determined by a small group of economically 
powerful states,  to the exclusion of less powerful states and civil  society.  The recent 
UNFCCC COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark ultimately produced a very modest 
outcome  negotiated  largely  by  a  small  group  of  key  countries.  The  result  from 
Copenhagen has strengthened calls for international climate governance to be pared down 
to a smaller decision making forum of ‘key’ countries only. This paper argues the above 
developments  embody  a  discourse  of  ‘exclusive  minilateralism’  that  represents  a 
significant discursive challenge to the multilateral discourse that has been the basis of 
international climate change governance since the inception of United Nations climate 
regime  in  1992.  The  exclusive  minilateral  discourse  contests  the  established  inter-
subjective meaning of the process of international climate governance by promoting more 
opaque state-based negotiations and power-based outcomes that will allegedly provide 
greater  effectiveness  in  reducing  global  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  A  continued 
strengthening of the exclusive minilateralist discourse will provide a significant challenge 
to  the  cosmopolitan  democratic  design  of  the  UNFCCC and also  to  the  deliberative 
potential  of  wider  notions  of  discursive  democracy  in  international  climate  change 
governance.
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Introduction
This  paper  explores  an  important  recent  development  in  the  process  of  international 
climate change governance. That development is the formation of a number of selective 
state-based forums for dialogue and/or decision-making on climate change outside the 
established  institutional  structure  of  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on 
Climate  Change (UNFCCC). A number of  these selective  state-based climate  forums 
were instigated by the United States and Australia, the two developed countries under 
Annex 1 of the UNFCCC that for the most part of the last decade remained opposed to 
the binding emission reduction targets and differentiated emission reduction obligations 
of the Kyoto Protocol.1 The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
(APP), the APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration of 2007 (APEC Sydney Declaration) and 
the US Major Economies Meetings (MEM) of 2007-08 were all instigated and/or heavily 
supported  by  the  US and Australia.  A common  thread  to  these  selective  state-based 
climate change forums is a willingness to allow important decision making on climate 
change to be devolved to a small group of key state actors with little or no input from 
civil society groups. This paper seeks to analyse this recent development in international 
climate governance in terms of its fidelity to democratic governance principles.
The first section of this paper outlines the interdisciplinary research design of the paper 
that  draws  on  the  disciplines  of  international  law  (IL)  and  critical  constructivist 
international relations (IR) theory. This section also outlines the concept of ‘discourse’ 
that is later relied on to analyse the emergence of these selective state-based forums and 
the  contestation  they  offer  to  existing  inter-subjective  meaning  on  the  process  for 
international  governance  of  climate  change.  The second section  outlines  the  two key 
theoretical traditions of democratic thinking, cosmopolitan and deliberative, that are later 
used in analysis of these selective state-based climate forums. The third section of the 
paper  builds  on  this  by  introducing  the  concept  of  ‘minilateralism’  that  has  been 
developed by a number of academic authors and policy commentators to support a shift 
towards  more  exclusive  modes  of  governance  of  international  problems.  The  fourth 
1 Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol upon the Rudd Labor Government coming to power in November 
2007.
section briefly outlines the process of the UN climate regime and three selective state-
based climate change forums that have arisen and been promoted in particular by the US 
and Australia  over  the past  five years.  The final  section of the paper  discusses these 
selective  state-based  climate  change  forums  in  terms  of  a  discourse  of  ‘exclusive 
minilateralism’  that  is  contesting  the  multilateral  discourse  (and  inter-subjective 
meaning) on the processes of climate change governance. The paper concludes with some 
observations  on  the  risks  which  the  exclusive  multilateralist  discourse  poses  for 
cosmopolitan and discursive democracy in the international climate governance. 
The following section sets out the research design and theoretical underpinnings of this 
paper.
1. Research Design
Critical Constructivist International Relation Theory 
Constructivism is an interpretivist IR theory that focuses upon the “role of ideas, norms, 
knowledge,  culture,  and  arguments  in  politics,  stressing  in  particular  the  role  of 
collectively held ‘intersubjective’  ideas and understanding on social  life”.2 Unlike the 
three  more  established  IR  theories  of  realism,  institutionalism  and  liberalism, 
constructivists:
…reject  the notion that states or other actors have objectively  determined  
interests that they can pursue by selecting strategies and designing effective  
institutions.  Rather, international actors operate within a social context of  
shared subjective understandings and norms, which constitute their identities  
and roles and define appropriate forms of conduct… Most specific norms and 
understandings  are  generated,  disseminated,  and internalised  through the 
efforts and discourse of diverse actors…In the constructivist  view, even as 
states and other actors create norms and institutions to further their interests  
and values, those norms and institutions are redefining those interests and 
values, perhaps even the identities of the actors themselves.3
2 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 2001, ‘The Constructivist Research Program in International 
Relations and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 4, p. 392
3 Kenneth W. Abbott, 2004, ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing 
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts’, American Journal of International Law, 93, p.367
The  constructivist  emphasis  on  ideas,  which  are  often  referred  to  as  ‘norms’  in  this 
literature,4 is  an obvious  common starting point  for interdisciplinary  research designs 
incorporating IL and constructivist IR theory. The constructivist IR tradition is divided 
into two broad strands.  Firstly,  conventional  constructivism,  seeks to trace  the causal 
impact  of  identities  and  norms  on  state  behaviour.5 The  conventional  constructivist 
approach is concerned with identifying the causative effect of particular ideas or norms 
on state behaviour during a specific event or series of events in the international system.6 
Conventional constructivist work adopts a research design more closely aligned with the 
positivist  social  science  paradigm  in  formulating  hypotheses  regarding  the  causal 
influence  of  norms  on  past  state  behaviour  and  subjecting  them  to  empirical 
investigation.7 However, the second strand of constructivist work, critical constructivism, 
is less wedded to the positivist paradigm. Critical constructivism is more concerned with 
“uncovering the power relations  that underpin and are reproduced by social  relations, 
including knowledge-creating and knowledge-laden relations”8 that privilege some actors 
over others. Finnemore and Sikkink describe critical constructivism as:
Work  of  “critical”  constructivism  has  intellectual  roots  in  critical  social  
theory, including such figures as Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, and 
Michel  Foucault.  Although  it  shares  the  core  features  of  constructivism 
identified above, critical constructivism adds a belief  that constructions of  
reality  reflect,  enact,  and reify  relations  of  power.  Critical  constructivists  
believe that certain powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of  
social construction. The task of the critical scholar is both to unmask these  
ideational  structures  of  domination  and  to  facilitate  the  imagining  of  
alternative  worlds.  Critical  constructivists  thus  see  a  weaker  autonomous 
role for ideas than do other constructivists because ideas are viewed as more 
tightly linked to relations of material power.9
Critical  constructivist  IR  theory  is  thus  concerned  with  how  ideas  are  used  as  an 
expression of power to shape the inter-subjective meaning of international phenomena 
4 David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Helene Lambert, 2007, International Law and International  
Relations, Cambridge University Press, p.97.
5 Ibid, p.100.  For a prominent example of conventional constructivist work see: Alexander Wendt, 1999, 
A Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press.
6 Armstrong et al., supra note 4, p.100
7 Mary E. Pettenger, 2007, The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms,  
Discourses, Ashgate, United States, pp. 9-10
8 Armstrong et al., supra note 4, p.100
9 Finnemore and Sikkink, supra note 2, p.398
and  the  interests  of  the  actors  concerned.  Critical  constructivist  IR  theory  usefully 
complements international law research in providing a theoretical framework for analysis 
of the political  context in which international law and institutions are formed. Unlike 
conventional constructivism, the critical IR approach does not seek to test the effect of 
international  law as  a  causal  mechanism on particular  instances  of  state  behaviour.10 
Rather, critical constructivism provides understanding of the power-laden web of inter-
subjective meaning embodied in international law and institutions. Critical constructivist 
IR theory also offers a theoretical  framework for analysing how such inter-subjective 
meaning is contested and subject to change over time. Critical constructivism’s ‘critical’ 
(i.e.  emancipatory)  potential  is in providing understanding of the power-laden web of 
inter-subjective  meaning  that  constitutes,  and  is  constituted  by,  international  law and 
institutions.  This  understanding  thereby  opens  up  the  possibility  of  international 
collective self-reflection for change. As Neufeld explains:
…it  is  clear  how  interpretative  approaches  offer  support  for  notions  of  
progressive  and  emancipatory  change  in  the  global  order.  The 
intersubjective meanings which constitute the global order are themselves  
the product of an ongoing process of self-definition and self reflection, they  
are, then like all practices which instantiate them, open to change.11
Current international law, institutions and practices might therefore be viewed not as a 
natural ‘given’ reality, impervious to substantial change, but rather one of many possible 
socially  constructed  orders  of  inter-subjective  meaning  available  to  the  international 
community.12 A critical constructivist  understanding of international affairs thus opens 
the possibility for understanding discursive contestation over current international law, 
institutions and practices.13
10 Even more adventurous sociological analysis within international legal scholarship has not been able to 
prove international law as a decisive causal mechanism in the behaviour of states, see Abram Chayes, 1974, 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, Oxford University Press, London.
11  Mark Neufeld, 1993, ‘Interpretation and the Science of International Relations’, Review of International 
Studies, 19(1), p.58
12 Ibid, p.59
13 John S. Dryzek, 2006, Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World, 
Polity Press.
Interdisciplinarity: Critical Constructivist IR Theory and International Law
Despite  the  areas  of  common  ground  between  the  theoretical  frameworks  of  critical 
constructivist  IR theory and international  legal  analysis  there  have been only limited 
attempts to expressly specifically link the two in research design. The most substantial 
exploration of the use of critical constructivist IR theory in analysis of international law 
and institutions comes from the work of Australian IR theorists Shirley Scott14 and John 
Dryzek.15 Scott has developed a theory to explore the ideational content of international 
agreements and their political context within the power-political struggles of international 
relations.16 For Scott, this involves looking closely at the wider political circumstances in 
which international  agreements  are formed and identifying the ‘cognitive structure of 
cooperation’ implicit in the agreement.17 Drawing on ideology theory, Scott suggests that 
international agreements are typically drafted to define a problem and frame solutions in 
accordance  with  an  underlying  set  of  interrelated  principles  known as  a  ‘foundation 
ideology’.18 The foundation ideology may only be indirectly referred to in the text of an 
international agreement. However, when an agreement is viewed in the wider political 
context of its formation,  the foundation ideology provides the normative basis for the 
framing  of  the  problem  and  inter-subjective  belief  on  the  range  of  available  policy 
responses.19 
Another prominent attempt to link critical constructivist international relations theory and 
international law analysis lies is in the discourse theory of Dryzek.20 Like Scott, Dryzek’s 
theory invites international lawyers to look beneath the text of an international agreement 
14 Shirley V. Scott, 2004, The Political Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
15 Dryzek, supra note 13, John S. Dryzek, 2007, ‘Paradigms and Discourses’ in Daniel Bodanky, Jutta 
Brunee and Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford  University 
Press, United States.
16 Scott, supra note 14. See also, Shirley V. Scott, 2007, ‘The Political Interpretation of Multilateral 
Treaties: Reconciling Text with Political Reality’, New Zealand Journal of Public International Law, 5, 
pp.103-120. 
17 Scott, 2004, supra note 14, pp. 110-113
18 The other elements of the CSC embodied in a treaty, as identified by Scott, are the CSC Issue,  
Legitimation Goal, CSC Community of Interest, Foundation Ideology, CSC Myth and CSC Solution. See, 
Scott 2004 supra note 14, pp.12-19
19 Scott, 2004, supra note 14, pp.15-16
20 John S. Dryzek, 2005, The Politics of the Earth; Second Edition, Oxford University Press, United States, 
John S. Dryzek, 2007, supra note 15, pp.44-62.  See Dryzek, 2006, supra note 13, p.23 for discussion of 
the critical constructivist research design of his work.
to  the  underlying  ideas  and  inter-subjective  meanings  upon  which  an  international 
agreement  is  structured.21 Dryzek  refers  to  this  set  of  underlying  ideas  and  inter-
subjective beliefs as a ‘discourse’, which he defines as:
a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents  
with  a  framework  for  making  sense  of  situations,  embodying  judgements,  
assumptions, capabilities, dispositions and intentions.22 
Dryzek  has  provided  a  typology  of  the  more  prominent  discourses  operating  in 
environmental  governance23 and  international  politics  more  generally24 over  recent 
decades. He suggests that discourses are social structures that both enable and constrain 
actions25.  Discourse  is  constraining  in  the  sense  that  it  is  constitutive  of  the  subject 
dispositions  and  capacities  of  actors  and  is  produced  and  reproduced  by  subsequent 
actions and interactions.26 Discourse is also enabling in the sense that actors draw on 
existing discourses to “subtly affect the content and weight of discourses” within a given 
social structure.27  Dryzek thus comments:
Discourses can embody power in that they condition norms and perceptions  
of  actors,  suppressing  some interests  whilst  advancing  others.  Discourses  
pervade, constitute,  and help explain the structure of international affairs.  
The power of discourses arises in their ability to structure and coordinate the  
actions of individuals’ subject wholly or partly to them.28
Dryzek  argues  that  some  discourses  are  ‘hegemonic’  in  the  sense  that  they  are  so 
ingrained in social structures that they are “not even recognised by those subject to them, 
but are instead treated as the natural order of things”.29 However, discourses are not static. 
Over time, coalitions of actors (i.e. discourse coalitions) emerge with alternate discourses 
that  seek  to  contest  even  hegemonic  discourses.30 This  contestation  leads  to  change 
through  either  a  dialectical  accommodation/merging  of  competing  discourses  or  the 
21 Dryzek, 2007, supra note 15, p.60, uses the IT metaphor that discourses “can provide the ‘software’ that 
makes international regimes work, while more formal organizations and rules provide the ‘hardware’”.
22 Dryzek, 2006, supra note 13.
23 Dryzek 2005 supra note 20, Dyzek 2007, supra note 15.
24 Dryzek 2006, supra note 13.
25 Dryzek 2006, supra note 13, p.24-25, Like Scott, Dryzek’s approach builds on Anthony Giddens 
structuration theory, most fully described in: Anthony Giddens, 1984, The Constitution of Society: Outline 
of the Theory of Structuration, Polity Press, United Kingdom.
26 Dryzek 2007, supra note 15, p.62
27 Dryzek 2006, supra note 13, pp.24-25
28 Dryzek 2006, supra note 13, p.3
29 Dryzek 2006, supra note 13, p.8
30 Dryzek 2006, supra note 13.
defeat of a competing discourse. Although Dryzek argues that discourses are important in 
understanding  international  affairs,  he  importantly  points  out  that  they  cannot  alone 
explain  international  social  life  and  collective  outcomes.  Dryzek  concedes  that  other 
factors such as material  factors and non-linguistic  practices are also important.31 This 
paper adopts Dryzek’s concept of discourse in analysing contestation over the process of 
international climate governance that flows from the emergence of these selective state-
based forums.
The following section outlines  two broad theoretical  traditions  on democracy that  are 
used in analysis later in the paper.
2. Differing Models of Democracy
Democracy  is  itself  a  contested  concept.  As  Dryzek  explains,  there  are  two  leading 
theoretical models of democracy at a domestic level. Firstly,  liberal democracy, “deals 
only  in  the  reconciliation  and  aggregation  of  preferences  defined  prior  to  political 
interaction.”32 Liberal democratic theory views democracy as a social choice mechanism 
which reconciles conflict by aggregating individual actor preferences that are pre-formed 
and  hence  unaffected  by  political  interaction.  Liberal  democratic  activity  is  most 
obviously pursued by actors strategically furthering their pre-formed interests in voting in 
elections  to  determine  the  make  up  of  constitutionally  entrenched  institutions  of  the 
liberal state. Liberal democratic theory is thus directed towards the effectiveness and/or 
efficiency  of  the  aggregative  and  reconciliatory  functions  of  formal  constitutionally 
entrenched  institutions  of  the  liberal  state.  The  second  leading  theoretical  model  of 
democracy  at  a  domestic  level  is  deliberative  democracy.  In  deliberative  democracy, 
democratic  institutions  ought  to  be  designed  primarily  to  facilitate  deliberation  by 
political actors.33 As Dryzek explains, deliberation is “a social process distinguished from 
other  kinds  of  communication  in  that  deliberators  are  amenable  to  changing  their 
judgements, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions, which involve 
31 Dryzek 2007, supra note 15, p.62 
32 John S, Dryzek, 2000, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Oxford 
University Press, p.10
33 Ibid, p.1
persuasion,  manipulation  and deception.”34 Deliberative  democracy  is  thus  concerned 
with  the  “authenticity  of  democracy:  the  degree  to  which  democratic  control  is 
substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged in by competent citizens”.35 Institutions 
designed  to  promote  deliberative  democracy  are  thus  concerned  with  improving  the 
circumstances of communication and hence the capacity of actors to reflect  upon and 
change  their  preferences  (and  ultimately  voting  patterns  and  other  forms  of  political 
participation) in response to argument.
At  an  international  level,  there  is  no  institutional  equivalent  to  the  sovereign  of  the 
domestic liberal democratic state that has the power and capacity to make, enforce and 
administer  laws  that  may  override  the  consent  of  an  individual  citizen.  The  various 
institutions of the United Nations (i.e. Security Council, General Assembly, International 
Court  of  Justice)  come  the  closest  to  replication  of  the  functions  of  the  domestic 
sovereign,  however,  ultimately derive their  authority from the ongoing consent of the 
nation-states involved. Despite the lack of an equivalent to the domestic sovereign, liberal 
and deliberative theories of democracy have again been used to analyse the democratic 
credentials of international institutions.  The liberal democratic model of democracy has 
been adapted to the international sphere through the concept of cosmopolitan democracy. 
As Dryzek explains:
Cosmopolitan  democracy  favours  an  international  system  more  densely  
populated  by  institutions  that  both  secure  order  and  are  democratically  
accountable  in  direct  fashion-that  is,  not  just  at  one  remove,  through  any 
accountability of states that take part in such arrangements….Institutions would  
exist at multiple levels, not necessarily subordinate to higher levels as in a federal  
system… The project looks forward to ultimately to an international legal system  
enforcing democratically determined laws, a global parliament to hold all other 
global institutions to account and international control of a military that would in  
the long run yield demilitarisation…36
In its more extreme guises, the cosmopolitan democratic project advocates direct citizen 
election  of  supranational  institutions  that  have  the  authority  to  override  state 
sovereignty.37 The primary focus of all variants of cosmopolitan democracy is to extend 
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid
36 Dryzek 2006 supra note 13, p.152
37 George Monbiot, 2004, The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order, Polity Press
the  aggregative,  reconciliatory  and  accountability  features  of  the  domestic  liberal 
democratic model into international governance structures. The underlying premise of the 
cosmopolitan project  is that  individual  citizens  will  come to see themselves as world 
citizens  and hence  subordinate  their  more  local  identities  and  interests  to  a  common 
global project.38 
However, Dryzek’s discursive democracy is a model for the pursuit of democratic ideals 
in  international  affairs  that  draws  more  particularly  on  the  deliberative  tradition  of 
domestic democratic theory. Dryzek argues that in the international sphere, which lacks 
centralised  authority  and  has  more  dispersed  power  structures,  the  deliberative 
democratic project is best pursued through a democratic design that is:
transnational and discursive, highlighting dispersed and competent control over  
the  engagement  of  discourses  in  transnational  public  spheres,  which  in  turn  
constructs  or  influences  international  outcomes  in  a  variety  of  ways.  
Transnational democracy of this sort is not electoral democracy, and it is not  
sought in communicatively competent decentralised control over the content and 
weight of globally consequential discourses, which in turn resonates with theories  
of deliberative democracy stressing communicative action in the public sphere…
The public sphere encompasses social  movements and media communications,  
and can reach into corporations, states, and intergovernmental organisations. It  
is  an  informal,  communicative  realm  that  can  be  contrasted  with  the  
constitutional exercise of authority...39
The  weakness  of  centralised  authority  in  the  international  system  and  recourse  to 
principles  of  state  sovereignty  (ie  sovereign  independence)  to  avoid  international 
obligations  are  no  impediments  to  discursive  democracy.  The  ‘transnational  public 
sphere’ of civil society movements and media operations does not require a centralised 
source  of  authority  or  state  consent  in  order  to  engage  citizens  and  other  actors  in 
reflective, deliberative and communicative processes. As Dryzek explains, this activity in 
the international public sphere has a capacity to shape actor perceptions, interests and 
identities and the outcomes of more formal international institutional  processes.40 The 
formal institutions of international society in turn embody and reproduce discourses. The 
38 Dryzek 2006, supra note 13, p.153.
39 Ibid, p.154.
40 Dryzek supra note 32, p.121-122.
discourses  operating  in  the  transnational  public  sphere  and  formal  international 
institutions therefore operate in a mutually constitutive manner.41
The following section explains the concepts of ‘multilateralism’ and ‘minilateralism’ in 
international governance and builds links with the discussion of democratic theory above.
3. Multilateralism and Minilateralism in International Climate 
Governance
Multilateralism  in  international  affairs  involves  “creating  international  bodies, 
agreements, and rules through negotiation on the part of the states that will be subject to 
the  arrangements  in  question,  who  agree  to  be  bound  by  the  arrangements.”42 The 
creation of formal rule-based institutions at an international level to foster a cooperative 
approach to international issues lies at the heart of the multilateral project. However, this 
does not mean that multilateral institutions will all have high level of democratic process. 
The United Nations Security Council is one of the key multilateral  institutions of the 
post-war  period,  yet  its  five permanent  members  (i.e.  the victorious  allied  powers  of 
WW2) have an individual veto power over any substantive decisions of that forum.43 The 
democratisation  of  multilateral  institutions  is  the  essence  of  cosmopolitan  democratic 
project an international level, as discussed above.44 The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are 
the agreements that form the central basis of the multilateral institutions of international 
climate governance. The UNFCCC and Kyoto institutions at a formal level have good 
democratic  credentials  in  that  they  have  near  universal  franchise  and  specifically 
encourage  civil  society  participation  in  lobbying  and  educational  roles  with  their 
conference of the parties (COP) meeting process. The parties to the UNFCCC have not 
yet formally adopted the draft Rules of Procedure for COP meetings drafted in 1996. 
However, the parties to the UNFCCC have in practice each year agreed to apply those 
rules draft Rules of Procedure to their meetings. The exception to this practice is found in 
draft rule 42, which deals with the voting requirements for a “matter of substance” to be 
41 Ibid, p.121.
42 Dryzek supra note 13, p.129
43 Art 27(3) of the Charter of the United Nations 1945.
44 Dryzek, supra note 13, p.129
decided by the COP.45 In the absence of agreement on majority voting “there is a broad 
understanding in the climate change regime that substantive decisions should be adopted 
by  consensus.”46 This  consensus  decision  making  rule/practice  provides  the  formal 
possibility of equality of state participation in the UNFCCC COP meetings as even the 
smallest countries have a potential veto power over substantial decisions of the COP.47 
Similarly the role of non-governmental organisations (including environmental groups) is 
enshrined in the UN climate treaty process.48 Regardless of the practical  realities  that 
prevail at particular COP meetings,49 the UN climate meeting process is at least designed 
for  a  high level  of  inclusiveness,  openness  and transparency involving  all  states  and 
interested civil  society groups.  Leaving aside the events of the Copenhagen COP, the 
UNFCCC  and  Kyoto  Protocol  has  generally  instantiated  an  inter-subjective 
understanding or discourse about the process of governing climate change that might be 
described as inclusive multilateralism.
However,  there  is  a  growing body of  academic  literature  and policy  commentary  on 
international  climate  governance  that  is  significantly  contesting  the  inclusive 
multilateralist  discourse  of  the  UN  climate  regime.  This  work  argues  that  greater 
effectiveness in responding to climate change might be found in institutions involving a 
45 For  draft  Rule  42,  see:  UNFCCC,  1996,  Organizational  Matters:  Adoption  of  Rules  of  Procedure, 
available  online at:  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/02.pdf ,  p.12. Draft  Rule 42 contains two draft 
voting rules for the COP to make decisions on “matters of substance”. The first rule allows for a retreat 
from a consensus voting rule to a two-thirds or three-quarters majority voting rule once attempts to reach 
consensus are exhausted. The second requires a consensus vote except on financial matters.
46 Yasmin Farhana and Joanna Depledge, 2004,  The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to  
Rules, Institutions and Procedures, Cambridge University Press, p.442. Consensus is generally taken to be 
present if no party raises a formal objection to a particular decision, see Farhana and Depledge p.443-444
47 However, in practice, the formal equality of the COP consensus arguably is weaker as countries only 
have limited resources to participate in meetings; see J. Timmons-Roberts and Bradley C. Parks, 2006, A 
Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics and Climate Policy, MIT Press. Countries 
also participate in negotiating blocks at the COP meetings that may act to practically constrain the exercise 
of an individual country veto power.
48 For  example,  UNFCCC Art  7(2)(l),  states  the COP shall:  “Seek  and utilize,  where  appropriate,  the 
services  and  cooperation  of,  and  information  provided  by,  competent  international  organizations  and 
intergovernmental  and  non-governmental  bodies;  UNFCCC Art  7(6)  also states  ‘Any body or  agency, 
whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered 
by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the 
Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present 
object.” 
49 There were criticisms from civil society groups claiming they was marginalised during the Copenhagen 
meeting.
smaller number of key states, particularly the large emitting countries.50 US author David 
Victor is a keen advocate of these select decision making forums on climate change:
In the area of international cooperation the solutions lie in efforts to create a club  
of  a  small  number  of  important  countries  and  craft  the  elements  of  serious  
cooperation.  The  efforts  probably  can’t  emerge  within  the  UNFCCC process 
because it is too large and inclusive. Nor can it easily arise from other available  
forums such as the G8, because their membership is too skewed to include the 
dozen  or  so  countries  that  must  be  part  of  an  effective  solution.  The  most 
interesting idea for a new institution is outgoing Canadian Prime Minister Paul  
Martin’s concept for a forum of leaders from the twenty key countries.51
This call for key decisions in climate change governance to be reduced to a select 
forum has been echoed by US foreign policy Wright52, Australian climate policy 
commentator  Kellow53 and  Australian  Opposition  climate  change  spokesman 
Greg Hunt M.P.54 Prominent UK sociologist Anthony Giddens has also advocated 
for  smaller  forums  of  key  nations  to  make  decisions  on  international  climate 
change policy:
The large bulk of greenhouse gas emissions is produced by only a limited number 
of countries- as far as mitigation is concerned, what the majority of states do  
pales  in significance  compared to  the activities  of  the large polluters.  Only a  
limited number of states have the capability seriously to pioneer technological  
innovation relevant to climate change.....To be able to exploit this situation, we  
need quite a different perspective from those that emerged from Kyoto and Bali.  
An approach based on agreements or partnerships between individual nations,  
groups  of  countries  and  regions  makes  more  sense-  and  could  eventually  
strengthen more universal measures....A body representing the major polluters  
should be established post-haste. If we include the EU as a single entity, then 70  
percent of cumulative world emissions of greenhouse gases have been produced  
by just six countries. They should be meeting regularly with one another.55
50 It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the claims to greater effectiveness in reducing emissions 
made by supporters of minilateralism. For the purposes of the following discussion, it shall be shall 
assumed that there as significant merit in the exclusive minilateralist claims in this regard.
51 David G Victor, 2006, ‘Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, 
Interests and Institutions’, Global Environmental Politics, 6(3), p. 101
52 Thomas Wright, 2009, ‘Toward Effective Multilateralism: Why Bigger May Not Be Better’, The 
Washington Quarterly, July 2009, p.167.
53 Aynsley Kellow, 2006, ‘A New Process for Negotiating Multilateral Environmental Agreements? The 
Asia-Pacific Partnership Beyond Kyoto’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60(2), pp.287-303
54 Greg Hunt, 2009, ‘After Copenhagen: Time for the Major Economies Forum’, The Australian, 31 
December 2009, available at: http://www.greghunt.com.au/Pages/Article.aspx?ID=1642 
55 Anthony Giddens, 2009, The Politics of Climate Change, Polity Press, p.220-221.
This view is supported by leading Oxford climate change policy commentators, 
Steven Rayner and Gwyn Pryns:
Relying  on  an  international  agreement  that  requires  the  consent  of  all  national  
governments inevitably results in the very lowest of common denominators. Since 
fewer  than  twenty  countries  account  for  80%  of  the  world’s  emissions  and 
therefore have the potential to make any serious contribution to their mitigation,  
it would be better for diplomacy to focus upon them. In these early stages, the  
other 150 countries only get in the way.56
US  foreign  policy  commentator Moisés  Naím  has  coined  the  expression 
‘minilateralism’ to explain this approach of seeking a ‘magic number’ of key nations 
with  influence  upon  an  issue  to  craft  smaller  more  responsive  international 
institutions.57 The minilateral model for international institutions proposed by Victor, 
Wright, Kellow, Rayner and Pryns, Naím, Giddens and Hunt essentially excludes 
non-key states and civil society from the decision making forums. This discourse on 
international  climate  change  policy  might therefore  be  described  as exclusive 
minilateralism.
The following section provides a brief outline of the United Nations climate regime and 
three leading select state-based forums for international climate change dialogue and that 
were formed over the past five years.
4. The United Nations Climate Regime and its Others
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol
The  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change58 (UNFCCC)  was 
formed in 1992 as a global agreement to provide broad principles to guide the human 
response  to  climate  change.  The  UNFCCC was  formed  in  response  to  the  scientific 
advice provided by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).59 The 
56 Gwyn Prins and Steve Rayner, 2007, ‘The Wrong Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate Policy’, 
available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/mackinderProgramme/pdf/mackinder_Wrong
%20Trousers.pdf p.27
57 Moises Naim, 2009, ‘Minilateralism; the Magic Number to Get Real International Action’, Foreign 
Policy, July/August 2009. 
58 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, 1771, U.N.T.S, p.107 (UNFCCC).
59 John Houghton, Geoffrey Jenkins and J. Ephraums (eds), 1990, IPCC First Assessment Report 1990, 
Scientific Assessment of Climate Change: Report of Working Group 1, Cambridge University Press, United 
Kingdom. 
UNFCCC established an agreed global goal of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at a 
level that will prevent dangerous climate change,60 a general obligation on all countries to 
collect data on and report their greenhouse gas emissions61 and important burden-sharing 
principles  to  guide  the  future  level  of  obligations  from  developed  and  developing 
countries.62 The UNFCCC has almost universal coverage, including ratification by the 
United  States.  In  perhaps  a  sign  of  naivety  at  the  coming  difficulties  in  reducing 
greenhouse emissions, the developed countries listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC set as 
aspirational, non-binding target to reduce their national greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels  by the  year  2000.63 However,  it  was  soon recognised that  stronger  action  was 
required from the Annex 1 developed countries than aspirational targets. 
Through  the  1995  Berlin  Mandate64 of  the  UNFCCC,  a  two-year  period  of  global 
negotiations was scheduled with a view to setting binding emission reduction targets for 
the  UNFCCC Annex 1 countries.  Negotiations  for  these  binding  emission  reductions 
targets were completed at the UNFCCC Third Conference of the Parties (COP3) meeting 
in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change65 (Kyoto) contains obligation for developed countries (ie listed in Annex B) to 
lead on reducing greenhouse gas emissions by taking binding targets to reduce or limit 
their greenhouse gas emissions, against a 1990 baseline, by the target period of 2008-
2012.  The  developing  countries  were  exempted  from  this  initial  period  of  emission 
reduction targets due to the equity principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDR),  agreed  to  in  the  UNFCCC.  The  CBDR  principle  required  that  developed 
countries  initially  lead  the  way  in  emission  reduction  activities.  The  US  Clinton 
Administration argued strongly at the Kyoto COP meeting for including market-based 
flexibility mechanisms in the treaty, namely, emissions trading, joint implementation and 
60 Art. 2 of UNFCCC.
61 Art. 4(1)(a) of UNFCCC.
62 Art. 3(1) of UNFCCC.
63 Art. 4(2)(a) of UNFCCC.
64 UNFCCC,1995, The Berlin Mandate Decision 1/CP.1, UN doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf , p.4-6.
65 UNFCCC, 1997, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 37 
ILM 22 (1998), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf 
a  Clean  Development  Mechanism,  to  assist  the  developed  countries  in  meeting  their 
emission targets at a least financial cost.66 
However, in early in 1997, the US Senate indicated that it would oppose US ratification 
of  any  climate  change  treaty  that  placed  binding  emission  reductions  on  developed 
countries only, or which would harm the US economy. This presented a potentially fatal 
obstacle to US participation in the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the position of the US Senate, 
the Clinton Administration signed Kyoto in 1998 and continued attending meetings to 
negotiate  the  finer  details  of  its  implementation,  including  rules  for  the  flexibility 
mechanisms.  Doubts  over  US  participation  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol  further  escalated 
towards  the  end of  the  Clinton  Administration.  In  late  2000,  at  the  UNFCCC COP6 
meeting at The Hague, the Clinton Administration abandoned negotiations on rules for 
implementing the flexibility mechanisms of Kyoto. In early 2002, the incoming G.W. 
Bush Administration  formally  announced  the  US would  not  ratify  Kyoto  and  would 
withdraw  from  all  further  discussions  under  the  Protocol.  Australia  made  a  similar 
announcement shortly thereafter. The US and Australia, two Annex 1 countries that had 
agreed to emission limitation targets at Kyoto, thus indicated they would not ratify the 
treaty and were openly opposed to developing nations being granted a period of grace 
without  binding  emission  reduction  obligations.  Despite  the  US and Australian  stand 
against Kyoto, international negotiations on the rules to implement the treaty continued 
during 2001 with agreement on fine details to implement Kyoto finally reached at the 
UNFCCC COP 7 meeting in Marrakech in late 2001.67 The Russian Federation ratified 
the  Kyoto  Protocol  in  November  200468,  thereby  bringing  the  treaty  into  force.  The 
developed countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol were then bound to meet their 
emission targets for the first commitment period of 2008-2012. The UNFCCC COP 13 
meeting in Bali, Indonesia agreed on a two year period of negotiations for the shape of 
the international climate change regime after the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
66 Joanna Depledge, 1995, ‘Against the Grain: The United States and the Global Climate Change Regime’, 
Global Change Peace and Security, 17(1), pp.16-19.
67UNFCCC, 2002, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Marrakesh  29 October 
to 10 November 2001, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 
68 UNFCCC, 2009, Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification_20090826corr.p
df 
Protocol expires in late 2012.69 This negotiation was carried out under ‘two tracks’, one 
involving the Kyoto Protocol countries that looked to strengthen the Annex B emission 
reduction  commitments  of  developing  countries  (Ad Hoc Working  Group on Further 
Commitments  for  Annex  I  Parties  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol),  the  second  (Ad  Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention) that included 
all countries party to the UNFCCC, including the US. The Copenhagen COP15 meeting 
in late 2009 was supposed to be a point of agreement on a new global architecture for the 
post-2012  period.  However,  the  COP15  meeting  only  produced  the  Copenhagen 
Accord,70 an  agreement  of  two  pages  in  length  negotiated  by  a  sub-group  of 
approximately six countries, agreed to by approximately twenty countries at the meeting 
and ultimately only ‘noted’ by the wider COP meeting, rather than formally endorsed as a 
COP decision.
The Asia Pacific Partnership 2005
The launch of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) in 
mid-2005 came  us  a  surprise  to  the  international  community  and  media.71 The  APP 
countries  had provided no prior indication that  they were negotiating an international 
climate  change  agreement.  The  partnership  was  officially  announced  at  a  press 
conference at the 2005 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial 
meeting in Vientiane, Laos.72 Government Ministers from the six original APP countries; 
China, India, Japan, Australia South Korea and the US were at the launch. The Ministers 
explained  the  partnership  was  an  “innovative  and  a  fresh  new  development  for  the 
environment,  for energy,  security  and for economic development  in the region”.73 An 
APP  ‘Vision  Statement’74 was  released  at  the  launch  however  it  contained  little 
information on how the partnership would operate. The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr 
69 UNFCCC, 2007, Bali Action Plan, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf 
70 UNFCCC, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf 
71 Paul Brown and Jamie Wilson, 2005, ‘US Plan to Bypass Kyoto Protocol’, The Guardian, 28 July 2005, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/28/environment.usa 
72 Ibid.
73Alexander Downer , 2005, Press Conference ITECC:Vientiane, Laos, 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/25167/20060602-
0000/www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2005/050728_vientiane.html 
74 Asia-Pacific Partnership, 2009, Vision Statement,  available at: 
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/resources/vision.pdf 
Downer, was the first to state the official APP position that the partnership was intended 
to  complement  the  Kyoto  Protocol  rather  than  provide  an  alternative.75 The  partner 
countries have regularly repeated this official claim about the relationship between the 
APP and Kyoto Protocol over the past four years. 
The first Ministerial meeting of the APP was held in Sydney, Australia in January 2006.76 
A  ‘Charter’  document  was  released  at  the  Sydney  meeting  that  describes  the 
organisational structure of the partnership.77 The APP Charter establishes a governing 
body known as the ‘Policy and Implementation Committee’ (PIC) that is comprised of 
representatives from the seven partner governments.78 The Charter also establishes eight 
sectoral (i.e. industry based) Task Forces comprised of representatives from the partner 
governments, public research bodies and the private sector. It is the role of the APP Task 
Forces to formulate project plans for approval and funding allocation by the PIC.79 At the 
2006 Sydney Ministerial meeting the PIC approved over 100 projects for the eight Task 
Forces.80 By 2009, the total number of Task Force projects approved by the PIC was over 
170.81 The APP Task Forces meet several times each year although the exact number and 
timing of these meeting is not known. As at 2008, the APP had received only a total of 
$US200 million in public funding pledged by the seven partner governments.82 The APP 
expects  the  private  sector  to  provide  a  significant  amount  of  the  funding  for  the 
implementation of APP Task Force projects.83
75 Alexander Downer, 2005, Press Conference ITECC:Vientiane, Laos, 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/25167/20060602-
0000/www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2005/050728_vientiane.html 
76 Connie Levett, Louise Dodson and Cynthia Banham, 2005, ‘Pact halves Emissions by next Century’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 2009, available at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/pact-halves-
emissions-by-the-next-century/2005/07/28/1122143966688.html 




81 Asia-Pacific Partnership, 2010, Project Roster, available at: 
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82 US Department of State, 2008, US Involvement in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development  
and Climate, available at: http://www.app.gov/library/111306.htm 
83  Ibid.
A number of countries have expressed interest in joining the APP since its formation. In 
October 2006, New Zealand released cabinet minutes indicating a desire to participate in 
the APP, initially by seeking involvement in APP Task Force activities.84 The Russian 
Federation and Mexico have also expressed interest in joining the APP.85 In late-2007, 
Canada was admitted as the seventh partnership country. To date,  Canada is the only 
country  that  has  been  granted  membership  to  expand  the  APP.  The  APP  is  thus 
comprised of a select grouping of seven countries. PIC meetings of the APP have only 
involved elite state actors. Civil society has generally been excluded from APP meetings.
APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration 2007
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings were initiated by Australia in 
the late-1980’s as an informal forum for dialogue amongst countries of the Asia Pacific 
region on trade liberalization issues. APEC has twenty-one member economies, including 
all APP nations except India. An APEC member country acts as coordinator and host an 
annual  round  of  meetings  for  national  leaders  and  senior  business  and  government 
officials. APEC does not have a founding charter or formal constitution but instead relies 
upon  an  agreed  set  of  procedures  for  hosting  of  its  meetings.  In  September  2007, 
Australia hosted the annual APEC Ministerial Meeting and Leaders Meeting in Sydney. 
At  the  meeting,  Australia  attempted  to  negotiate  an  APEC  position  on  a  long-term, 
aspirational (i.e. non-binding) global emissions reduction goal.86 The meeting produced 
the ‘Sydney APEC Leaders Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean 
Development’ (Sydney APEC Declaration). Given China’s reluctance to discuss global 
emissions goals, the Sydney APEC Declaration contains only a commitment by APEC 
countries to “work to achieve a common understanding on a long-term aspirational global 
emission  reduction  goal  to  pave  the  way  for  an  effective  post-2012  international 
arrangement.”87 The Sydney APEC Declaration adopts an approach similar to the APP of 
84  New Zealand Government, 2006, CBC Min 06 17/19: Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean development  
and Climate, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/resources/cabinet-papers/cbc-min-06-17-19.html 
85 Harro van Asselt, 2007, From Un-ity to Diversity? The UNFCCC, the Asia-Pacific partnership, and the 
Future of International Law on Climate Change, Carbon Climate Law Review pp.17-28.
86 Mariane Wilkinson 2007, APEC Soft on Emissions, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 August 2007.
87 APEC, 2007, Sydney APEC Leaders' Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security
and Clean Development, available at: 
http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/2007/aelm_climatechange.html 
shifting  the  focus  of  international  cooperation  on  climate  change  toward  voluntary 
commitments for research, information sharing and development of cleaner technologies. 
The Sydney Declaration also parallels the APP by focussing climate change policy on 
non-binding  targets  for  reduction  in  carbon  intensity.  The  Declaration  contains  an 
aspirational target for a 25% reduction in energy intensity in the APEC economies by 
2030, using 2005 as a base year.88 This energy intensity target is “APEC-wide” and so 
does not apply individually to any one country. The APEC Sydney Declaration again 
represented a shift towards international climate change policy being determined by sub-
groups of countries and civil society being excluded from the forum.
US Major Economies Meetings 2007-2008
In  early  2007,  President  G.  W. Bush announced a  new US initiative  climate  change 
initiative that was initially called the ‘Major Emitters and Energy Consumers’ process 
(MEP).89 The MEP proposed a series of US-sponsored meetings of fifteen of the world’s 
“top greenhouse economies and polluters” to “develop a long-term global goal to reduce 
greenhouse  gasses”  with  each  country  working  to  “achieve  this  emissions  goal  by 
establishing  ambitious  mid-term  national  targets  and  programs,  based  on  national 
circumstances.”90 The initiative envisioned that national targets and programs would be 
determined by each nation individually.91 The initiative also proposed that major emitting 
nations  “develop  parallel  national  commitments  to  promote  key  clean  energy 
technologies”, with the US facilitating international development banks to provide low-
cost financing options for clean energy technology transfer.92 The MEP was specifically 
intended to  “build  on and advance US relations  with the Asia-Pacific  Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate and other technology and bilateral partnerships”93. The 
MEP process would adopt the APP approach of drawing together representatives from 
various sectors such as power generation and energy production to devise a “common 
88 Ibid, p. 4






work program on best practices”.94 Despite launching the MEP, the Bush Administration 
claimed to be committed to the UNFCCC process and that the MEP meetings would 
“complement” ongoing UN activity.
The final MEP meeting was also held at the conclusion of the G8 summit in Hokkaido, 
Japan, in July 2008. This meeting produced the first publicly released document of the 
MEP, the ‘Declaration  of Leaders  Meeting  on Energy Security  and Climate  Change’ 
(MEP Leaders Declaration).95 The MEP Leaders Declaration contains a ‘shared vision’ 
for a long-term cooperative global goal for emission reduction, but does not contain any 
attempt to quantify such reduction. The MEP Leaders Declaration notes that developed 
nations will implement economy wide mid-term goals and actions to achieve absolute 
emission reductions.96 However, this statement on developed nation mid-term goals is 
heavily  qualified  in  that  where  applicable  developed  nations  may  simply  focus  on 
“stopping  the  growth”  of  emissions.97 This  accommodates  the  Bush Administration’s 
approach of the US concentrating on “stopping the growth” of national emissions until 
2025.  The  MEP Leaders  Declaration  also  strongly  emphasises  the  APP approach  of 
sectoral-based  technology  cooperation  and  information  exchange.  The  MEP  Leaders 
Declaration  quire  clearly  draws  inspiration  from  the  APP  task  force  approach  to 
technology  development.  In  March  2009,  the  US  Major  Economies  Process  was  re-
badged by the Obama Administration as the ‘Major Economies Forum on Energy and 
Climate.’98 The  seventeen  countries  of  this  new  Obama  backed  forum  met  on  five 
occasions99 in the lead up to the Copenhagen with a view to reaching agreement on key 
climate related issues.100
94 White House. (2007b). Press Briefing by Tony Snow and Jim Connaughton, Chairman of the Council on 
Environmental Quality, 31 May 2007, available at: http://georgewbush-
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95 White House. (2008b). Declaration of Leaders Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change 9 July 




98 US State Department, 2010, Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, 
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/mem/ 
99 US State Department, 2010, Chair's Summary: Fifth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the 
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/other/2009/130717.htm 
100 US State Department, supra note 99.
The following section discusses the above select state-based climate change institutions 
in terms of the exclusive minilateral discourse discussed above.
5. Exclusive Minilateralism: A Strengthening Discourse in 
International Climate Change Policy?
The exclusive minilateral  discourse identified in section three above has been steadily 
building  strength  in  academic  and  policy  commentating  circles  particularly  amongst 
authors opposed to the binding targets and timetables approach of the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, the strength of the exclusive minilateral discourse is even more evident in the 
intersubjective understanding underlying APP, APEC Sydney Declaration and US Major 
Economies  Meetings.  These non-UN climate  change forums have sought  to facilitate 
dialogue outside the UNFCCC process with a view to making important decisions on 
target ranges for medium and long-term global emission reduction. For example, the APP 
encourages each participating country to set its own non-binding greenhouse target to 
reduce greenhouse gas intensity, the level of ambition to be based on its own national 
circumstances.  The  APEC  Sydney  Declaration  contains  a  non-binding,  APEC-wide, 
medium-term energy intensity  reduction  target  of  very  modest  substance.  The  Major 
Economies  Meetings  were unable  to  agree  on a  figure  for  a  medium term collective 
emission reduction target. However, the US MEP endorsed a medium-term approach of 
all  countries  (including  developed  countries)  setting  and  implementing  their  own 
economy wide mid-term goals and actions on emission reduction that may be based on 
“stopping the growth” of their emissions (i.e. reduction of greenhouse gas intensity only) 
rather than reduction in emissions in absolute terms (i.e. below a 1990 a similar baseline). 
Important understandings have been built in these select non-UN forums as to the level 
ambition of future medium and long-term emission reduction targets. These negotiations 
have occurred and understandings been built in these select, non-UN minilateral forums 
that have excluded over 170 countries many of which will be impacted hardest by the 
early climate change impacts. Civil society organisations have also been largely excluded 
from attending and lobbying at these select, non-UN, minilateral forums. 
The  understandings  built  in  these  minilateral  forums  appear  to  have  significantly 
influenced the process and outcome of the Copenhagen COP 15 meeting. The COP15 
meeting was dogged by criticisms from smaller developing countries that key negotiating 
texts  occurred were developed in an opaque manner  by a  small  group of developing 
countries,101 rather than in the more open, transparent and participatory process of earlier 
UNFCCC meetings. The final text produced at COP 15, the Copenhagen Accord, was 
produce again in an opaque manner by a handful of key developed and large developing 
countries  and then presented to the full  COP meeting for approval.  The civil  society 
delegations  at  COP15  were  also  highly  critical  of  the  unusual  opaqueness  of  the 
negotiations and generating of negotiating texts at the meeting. The exclusive minilateral 
discourse of involving key state players only, to the exclusion of less-important states and 
civil society, appears to have been evident in the events of COP 15.
What does the strengthening of exclusive minilateral discourse mean for the furtherance 
of democratic principles in international climate change governance? 
First,  the exclusive minilateralist  discourse is in direct  contestation with cosmopolitan 
democratic version of liberal multilateralism. The very significant reduction in franchise 
advocated  by  the  exclusive  minilateral  discourse  (from  all  countries  concerned  with 
climate  change to  only  the key  emitters)  is  obviously at  odds  with the  expansion of 
democratic process in international institutions that is core to cosmopolitan theory. The 
exclusive minilateralist discourse is therefore vulnerable to attack on the basis of its lack 
of  legitimacy  and  failure  to  adhere  to  cosmopolitan  democratic  ideals.   Second,  the 
exclusive  minilateralist  discourse  openly  excludes  civil  society  from participation  in 
meetings  of  the  key  states  in  the  ‘inner  sanctum’  of  decision  making.  This  is  again 
directly inconsistent with the stronger variants of cosmopolitan democratic theory that 
seek an expansion of the democratic franchise beyond states to individual citizens. Third, 
the exclusive minilateralist discourse also has some potential negative affects upon the 
101  John Vidal, 2009, ‘Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after Danish text leak’, The Guardian 8 
December 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-
summit-disarray-danish-text 
level  of discursive democracy in the international  climate negotiations.  The ability  of 
civil  society  groups  to  participate  in  and  lobby  at  formal  international  meetings  on 
climate change is reduced and their ability to base their critique from a position of some 
intimacy within the formal institutional process is significantly weakened. However, as 
Dryzek points  out,  the  exclusion  of  civil  society  groups from the formal  governance 
international governance institutions may in some circumstances have a silver lining in 
boosting  the  democratic  vitality  of  civil  society,  particularly  where  civil  society  has 
previously  ‘muzzled’  its  critique  in  order  to  remain  within  existing  institutional 
structures.102 So whilst the strengthening of exclusive multilateralism has serious negative 
consequences  for  cosmopolitan  democratic  governance  of  climate  change  it  could 
embolden the vitality of civil society critique and engagement on international climate 
governance and hence the prospects for discursive democracy.103 
However, a continued strengthening of the exclusive minilateral discourse and prevalence 
of exclusive minilateral  institutions in international climate change governance carries 
significant risk that the economically powerful states will seek subtle redefinition of the 
‘problem’ of human induced climate change and limit  the range of acceptable  policy 
options  to  those  serving  their  immediate  interests.  The  various  minilateral  forums 
discussed  above  have  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  supported  a  rise  in  greenhouse 
emissions to 2050 that on the science of the IPCC will deliver in excess of three degrees 
annual  surface  temperature  increase  above  pre-industrial  levels.  The  country  pledges 
made to the Copenhagen Accord and modelling done in support of the APP both tacitly 
accept a rise in surface temperature of this magnitude.104 The ‘key nations’ involved in 
these  minilateral  forums  thus  have  already  arguably  affected  a  subtle  shift  in  inter-
subjective meaning on what level of ambition might realistically be expected in global 
emission reduction and hence what our ambition should be on the level of acceptable 
climate change.  The role of civil  society and the media in discursive democracy will 
102 Dryzek, supra note 32, p. 137.
103 Ibid. 
104 See: Climate Tracker 2010, http://www.climateactiontracker.org/  and Melanie Ford et al, 2006, ABARE 
Conference Paper 06.3: Perspectives on International Climate Policy, available at: 
http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/conference/conference_06/CP06_03.pdf 
become  all  the  more  important  in  critiquing  and  contesting  such  redefinition  of  the 
climate change problem and the range of acceptable responses. 
7. Conclusion
The  exclusive  minilateral  discourse  in  international  climate  change  governance  has 
strengthened significantly  over  the  past  five years  through both  academic  and policy 
commentary and US inspired institutional developments in the Asia-Pacific region. With 
the  problems  experienced  in  the  UN climate  process  at  Copenhagen  there  is  now a 
significant  likelihood  that  the  exclusive  minilateralist  discourse  will  continue  to 
strengthen  and  look  to  further  shape  global  climate  governance  institutions  This 
represents a threat to the pattern of inclusive multilateral  climate governance that has 
been  established  over  the  past  two  decades,  particularly  the  cosmopolitan  form  of 
consensus  decision  making  of  the  UNFCCC  meetings.  If  the  exclusive  minilateral 
discourse continues to strengthen, the role of the transnational public sphere in discursive 
democracy  will  become crucial  in  ensuring that  problem definition  and the  range  of 
acceptable policy responses is not skewed to far towards the interests of the countries 
allowed entry to the minilateral tent.
 
